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Abstract
Game (Israeli) options in a multi-asset market model with proportional
transaction costs are studied in the case when the buyer is allowed to exer-
cise the option and the seller has the right to cancel the option gradually
at a mixed (or randomised) stopping time, rather than instantly at an
ordinary stopping time. Allowing gradual exercise and cancellation leads
to increased flexibility in hedging, and hence tighter bounds on the option
price as compared to the case of instantaneous exercise and cancellation.
Algorithmic constructions for the bid and ask prices, and the associated
superhedging strategies and optimal mixed stopping times for both ex-
ercise and cancellation are developed and illustrated. Probabilistic dual
representations for bid and ask prices are also established.
1 Introduction
A game (i.e. Israeli) option is a contract between an option buyer and seller,
which allows the buyer the right to exercise the option, and the seller the right
to cancel the option at any time up to expiry. The payoff associated with such
a game option is due at the earliest of the exercise and cancellation times. If
the option is cancelled before it is exercised, then the buyer also receives ad-
ditional compensation from the seller. Game options were first introduced by
Kifer [Kif00] and have been studied in a frictionless setting in a number of pa-
pers; for a survey of this work see Kifer [Kif13a]. Game options have proved
to be important not only in their own right, but also because they underpin
the theory for other traded derivatives such as convertible bonds or callable op-
tions; see e.g. Kallsen and Ku¨hn [KalKuh05], Ku¨hn and Kyprianou [KuhKyp07],
Bielecki et al. [Bie08], Wang and Jin [WanJin09], or Kwok [Kwo14].
Transaction costs were first considered in the context of game options by
Kifer [Kif13b], who extended the results established for American options by
Roux and Zastawniak [RouZas09] in the case of a market with a single risky
security. Kifer’s work [Kif13b] has recently been generalised by Roux [Rou16]
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for game options in discrete multi-asset models with proportional transaction
costs. Due to a negative result by Dolinsky [Dol13] that the superreplication
price of a game option in continuous time under proportional transaction costs is
the initial value of a trivial buy-and-hold strategy, both Kifer [Kif13b] and Roux
[Rou16] study game options in discrete time. This approach is also adopted in
the present paper.
Consistently with the wider literature on game options, the papers by Kifer
[Kif13b] and Roux [Rou16] take it for granted that the option can only be ex-
ercised or cancelled instantaneously and in full, in other words, at an ordinary
stopping time. This means that pricing and hedging involves non-convex op-
timization problems for both the buyer and seller. In this case, Kifer [Kif13b]
and Roux [Rou16] showed that the bid and ask prices can be computed algorith-
mically, as can optimal strategies for both the buyer and the seller. Moreover,
they established probabilistic dual representations for the bid and ask prices. In
common with American options in this setting, the dual representations involve
so-called mixed (or randomised) stopping times (used before in various contexts
by Baxter and Chacon [BaxCha77], Chalasani and Jha [ChaJha01], Bouchard
and Temam [BouTem05] and many others).
In the present paper we allow increased flexibility for both the buyer and
seller by permitting both exercise and cancellation to take place gradually, i.e.
at a mixed stopping time, rather than instantaneously at an ordinary stopping
time. Such flexibility is available to investors who hold a portfolio of options and
may wish to manage their exposure by exercising or cancelling some of these
options at different times.
In the presence of proportional transaction costs, gradual exercise and can-
cellation is closely linked to the notion of deferred solvency; this has already
been studied in the context of American options with gradual exercise by Roux
and Zastawniak [RouZas14]. In the presence of a large bid-ask spread on the un-
derlying assets, for example in the event of temporary illiquidity in the market,
an agent may become insolvent in the traditional sense at some time instant t,
but still able to return to solvency at a later time by trading in a self-financing
way. Allowing such deferred solvency positions, rather than insisting on im-
mediate solvency at all times, also leads to increased flexibility in constructing
hedging strategies for both the seller and buyer of a game option.
In this setting, i.e. for game options with gradual exercise and cancellation
under transaction costs and deferred solvency, we establish algorithmic con-
structions of the bid and ask prices and of optimal hedging strategies for both
the seller and buyer of the option. In doing so, we extend the results of Kifer
[Kif13b] and Roux [Rou16], which apply to game options that allow only in-
stantaneous exercise and cancellation with immediate solvency.
It turns out that, in the presence of proportional transaction costs, allowing
deferred solvency along with gradual exercise and cancellation for game options
leads to tighter bid-ask spreads as compared to the case of instantaneous exer-
cise and cancellation, an advantage for the parties on either side of the option
contact. Moreover, it is important to note that allowing gradual exercise and
cancellation turns pricing and hedging for the buyer and seller of a game option
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into convex optimization problems, massively enhancing the efficiency of the
pricing and hedging algorithms as compared with the non-convex case studied
by Kifer [Kif13b] and Roux [Rou16]. Furthermore, convexity facilitates the use
of duality methods, and could potentially allow extending the linear vector op-
timisation techniques which were developed by Lo¨hne and Rudloff [LoRu14] for
European options.
The methods and results presented in this paper build on a large body of
work for European and American options under transaction costs, including
papers by Merton [Mer89], Dermody and Rockafellar [DerRoc91], Boyle and
Vorst [BoyVor92], Bensaid, Lesne, Page`s and Scheinkman [Ben92], Edirisinghe,
Naik and Uppal [EdNaUp93], Jouini and Kallal [JouKal95], Kusuoka [Kus95],
Koehl, Pham and Touzi [KoPhTo99, KoPhTo02], Stettner [Ste97, Ste00], Per-
rakis and Lefoll [PerLef97], Rutkowski [Rut98], Touzi [Tou99], Kabanov [Kab99],
Jouini [Jou00], Palmer [Pal01], Chalasani and Jha [ChaJha01], Kabanov and
Stricker [KabStr01], Kocin´ski [Koc04], Schachermayer [Scha04], Bouchard and
Temam [BouTem05], Tokarz and Zastawniak [TokZas06], Chen, Palmer and
Sheu [ChPaSh08], Roux, Tokarz and Zastawniak [RoToZa08], Roux and Za-
stawniak [RouZas09, RouZas14, RouZas16], Lo¨hne and Rudloff [LoRu14].
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the multi-asset model
with proportional transaction costs and summarizes the results from Roux and
Zastawniak [RouZas14] that will be used in this paper. Game options with
gradual exercise and cancellation are introduced in Section 3. Pricing algorithms
for the seller and buyer, together with dual representations, are presented in
Sections 4 and 5, with proofs deferred to Section 7. An example is provided in
Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Many-asset model with proportional transaction costs
We consider the discrete-time market model with many assets (conveniently
thought of as currencies) and proportional transaction costs introduced by Ka-
banov [Kab99] and studied by Kabanov and Stricker [KabStr01], Schacher-
mayer [Scha04] and others.
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space with filtration (Ft)
T
t=0. We assume
that Ω is finite, F0 = {∅,Ω}, FT = F = 2
Ω and P(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. For
each t = 0, . . . , T , by Ωt we denote the collection of atoms of Ft, called the
nodes of the associated tree model.
The market model contains d assets or currencies. At each trading date
t = 0, 1, . . . , T and for each k, j = 1, . . . , d, one unit of asset k can be obtained
by exchanging pijkt > 0 units of asset j. We assume that the exchange rates pi
jk
t
are Ft-measurable and pi
jj
t = 1 for all t and j, k.
For each t = 0, . . . , T let Lt := L
0(Rd;Ft) be the collection of Ft-measurable
Rd-valued random variables. We can identify elements of Lt with R
d-valued
functions on Ωt. Any x ∈ Lt can be thought of as a portfolio with positions
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x1, . . . , xd in the d assets. We say that a portfolio x ∈ Lt can be exchanged into
a portfolio y ∈ Lt at time t whenever there are Ft-measurable random variables
βjk ≥ 0, j, k = 1, . . . , d such that for all k = 1, . . . , d
yk = xk +
d∑
j=1
βjk −
d∑
j=1
βkjpikjt ,
where βjk represents the number of units of asset k received as a result of
exchanging some units of asset j.
The solvency cone Kt ⊆ Lt is the set of portfolios that are solvent at time t,
i.e. those portfolios at time t that can be exchanged into portfolios with non-
negative positions in all d assets. It follows that Kt is the polyhedral convex cone
generated by the canonical basis e1, . . . , ed of Rd and the vectors pijkt e
j − ek for
j, k = 1, . . . , d. We also refer to Kt as the immediate solvency cone to distinguish
it from the so-called deferred solvency cone Qt to be introduced later.
A trading strategy y = (yt)
T+1
t=0 is a predictable R
d-valued process with final
value assumed to be yT+1 = 0 for notational convenience. For each t > 0
the portfolio yt ∈ Lt−1 is held from time t − 1 to time t, and y0 is the initial
endowment. We denote by Φ the set of such trading strategies.
A trading strategy y ∈ Φ is said to be self-financing whenever yt−yt+1 ∈ Kt
for all t = 0, . . . , T −1. Note that no implicitly assumed self-financing condition
is included in the definition of Φ.
A trading strategy y ∈ Φ is called an arbitrage opportunity if it is self-
financing, y0 = 0 and there is a portfolio x ∈ LT \ {0} with x
j ≥ 0 for each
j = 1, . . . , d and such that yT −x ∈ KT . This notion of arbitrage was considered
by [Scha04], and its absence is formally different but equivalent to the weak no-
arbitrage condition introduced by [KabStr01].
Theorem 1 ([KabStr01, Scha04]) The model admits no arbitrage opportu-
nity if and only if there exists a probability measure Q equivalent to P and an
Rd-valued Q-martingale S = (St)
T
t=0 such that
St ∈ K
∗
t \ {0} for all t = 0, . . . , T, (1)
where K∗t := {y ∈ Lt | y · x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Kt} is the polar of −Kt.
We denote by P the set of pairs (Q, S) satisfying the conditions in Theorem 1,
and by P¯ the set of pairs (Q, S) satisfying the conditions in Theorem 1 but
with Q absolutely continuous with respect to (and not necessarily equivalent
to) P. We assume for the remainder of this paper that the model admits no
arbitrage opportunities, i.e. P 6= ∅.
Any portfolio x ∈ Kt is immediately solvent at time t, in the sense that it
can be converted at time t into one with non-negative positions in all d assets.
For American and game options under transaction costs, the following weaker
type of solvency also proves useful. We denote by Qt the collection of portfolios
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x ∈ Lt such that there is a sequence ys ∈ Ls−1 for s = t+1, . . . , T +1 satisfying
the conditions
x− yt+1 ∈ Kt, ys − ys+1 ∈ Ks for all s = t+ 1, . . . , T, yT+1 = 0.
We call such a sequence yt+1, . . . , yT+1 a liquidation strategy starting from x at
time t.
The portfolios in Qt are those that can eventually (though possibly not
immediately at time t) be converted by means of a sequence of self-financing
transactions into a portfolio with non-negative positions in all assets. An equiv-
alent way of constructing the deferred solvency cones is to put
QT := KT
and then
Qt := Qt+1 ∩ Lt +Kt for t = T − 1, . . . , 0
by backward induction. It turns out thatQt is a convex polyhedral cone. We call
it the deferred solvency cone. See [RouZas14] for more information on deferred
solvency.
2.2 Mixed stopping times
A mixed (or randomised) stopping time is a non-negative adapted process φ =
(φt)
T
t=0 such that
T∑
t=0
φt = 1.
The collection of mixed stopping times will be denoted by X .
For any φ ∈ X we put
φ∗t :=
T∑
s=t
φs for t = 0, . . . , T, φ
∗
T+1 := 0. (2)
Observe that φ∗ is a predictable process since φ∗0 = 1 is F0-measurable and
φ∗t = 1−
∑t−1
s=0 φs is Ft−1-measurable for each t = 1, . . . , T .
For example, in the case of a game option subject to gradual cancellation,
φt could represent a fraction of the option that is cancelled at time t, whereas φ
∗
t
would be the part of the option that has not been cancelled before t.
For any adapted process X and for any φ ∈ X we define the process X
evaluated at φ as
Xφ :=
T∑
t=0
φtXt.
We also put
Xφ∗t :=
T∑
s=t
φsXs for t = 0, . . . , T, X
φ∗
T+1 := 0.
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The collection T of ordinary stopping times can be embedded in X by iden-
tifying every τ ∈ T with the mixed stopping time χτ ∈ X defined as
χτt := 1{t=τ}
for each t = 0, . . . , T . (Here 1A denotes the indicator function of an event
A ∈ F .)
2.3 American options with gradual exercise and cancella-
tion
Here we collect the main notions and results concerning American options with
gradual exercise and cancellation under proportional transaction costs; for full
details, see [RouZas14]. These will be extended to game options, and will also
be used as tools to establish some key results for this extension.
Consider an American option with adapted payoff process Z = (Zt)
T
t=0,
where Zt ∈ Lt represents a portfolio of d assets for each t = 0, . . . , T . If the
buyer of the option is allowed to exercise it gradually according to a mixed
stopping time ψ ∈ X , then the sequence of portfolios ψtZt is to be delivered by
the option seller to the buyer at times t = 0, . . . , T .
The seller needs to hedge against all mixed stopping times ψ ∈ X that can
be chosen by the buyer. Because the seller can react to the buyer’s choice of ψ,
the hedging strategy may depend on ψ. We are going to write zψt for the time t
position in the strategy.
On each trading date t, the seller needs to deliver the payoff ψtZt and to
rebalance the strategy from zψt to z
ψ
t+1 without injecting any additional wealth,
and can only use knowledge of ψ and the market up to and including time t.
This leads to the following conditions.
Definition 2 Let Z = (Zt)
T
t=0 be an adapted process. For an American option
with payoff process Z and gradual exercise, a seller’s superhedging strategy is a
mapping z : X → Φ that satisfies the rebalancing condition
∀ψ ∈ X ∀t = 0, . . . , T : zψt − ψtZt − z
ψ
t+1 ∈ Kt (3)
and the non-anticipation condition
∀ψ, ψ′ ∈ X ∀t = 0, . . . , T :
⋂t−1
s=0{ψs = ψ
′
s} ⊆ {z
ψ
t = z
ψ′
t }. (4)
The family of such strategies will be denoted by Ψa(Z).
Definition 3 The seller’s (or ask) price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of an Ameri-
can option with payoff process Z and gradual exercise is defined as
paj(Z) := inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃z ∈ Ψa(Z) : xej = z0
}
.
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The following representation of the seller’s price was obtained in [RouZas14].
In this representation, for any ψ ∈ X , we denote by P¯dj (ψ) the collection of pairs
(Q, S) such that Q is a probability measure absolutely continuous with respect
to P and S is an Rd-valued adapted process such that
St ∈ Q
∗
t \ {0} and EQ(S
ψ∗
t+1|Ft) ∈ Q
∗
t for all t = 0, . . . , T,
where Q∗t := {y ∈ Lt | y · x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Qt} is the polar of −Qt.
Theorem 4 ([RouZas14, Theorem 4.2]) The seller’s price in currency j =
1, . . . , d of an American option with payoff process Z and gradual exercise can
be expressed as
paj(Z) = max
ψ∈X
max
(Q,S)∈P¯d
j
(ψ)
EQ((Z · S)ψ).
3 Game options with gradual exercise and can-
cellation
A game option as introduced in [Kif00] and studied in [Rou16] is a contract
between an option buyer and seller, which gives the buyer the right to exercise
the option at any stopping time τ ∈ T , and also gives the seller the right to
cancel the option at any stopping time σ ∈ T . There are two adapted processes
Y = (Yt)
T
t=0 and X = (Xt)
T
t=0 which determine, respectively, the payoffs due
when exercising and cancelling the option. In the presence of transaction costs
Y and X are Rd-valued (i.e. portfolio-valued) processes; see [Kif13b] in the
case when d = 2 and [Rou16] for any d ≥ 2. The seller has to deliver the
portfolio Yτ to the buyer at time τ when σ ≥ τ or the portfolio Xσ at time σ
when σ < τ . That is, the option will be terminated at time σ∧τ due to exercise
or cancellation, and the portfolio
Qσ,τ := 1{σ≥τ}Yτ + 1{σ<τ}Xσ
will be changing hands at that time. Observe that exercising the option takes
priority over cancellation when σ = τ . Additionally, it is assumed that
Xt − Yt ∈ Kt for each t = 0, . . . , T. (5)
The difference Xt − Yt can be regarded as a penalty payable by the seller on
top of the payoff Yt when cancelling the option. We shall refer to an option of
this kind as a game (or Israeli) option with instant exercise and cancellation,
to distinguish it from one with gradual exercise and cancellation as described
below.
In the present work we allow both the buyer and seller the freedom to exercise
or, respectively, to cancel the option gradually according to mixed stopping
times. If the buyer chooses a mixed stopping time ψ ∈ X as the exercise time
and the seller selects a mixed stopping time φ ∈ X to be the cancellation time,
then on each trading date t = 0, . . . , T the buyer will first be exercising a fraction
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ψt/ψ
∗
t of the current position in the option, and then the seller will be cancelling
a fraction φt/φ
∗
t of the remaining position in the option, where ψ
∗
t and φ
∗
t are
given by (2). Once again, exercising takes priority over cancellation.
In these circumstances, starting with an initial position of ψ∗0φ
∗
0 = 1 option at
time 0, we are going to show by induction that ψ∗t φ
∗
t of the option will neither be
exercised nor cancelled before time t, for each t = 0, . . . , T . It means that ψt/ψ
∗
t
of the current position ψ∗t φ
∗
t , that is, (ψt/ψ
∗
t )ψ
∗
t φ
∗
t = ψtφ
∗
t of the option will
be exercised at t, given that the buyer has priority to exercise. The remaining
position in the option will then be ψ∗t φ
∗
t − ψtφ
∗
t = (ψ
∗
t − ψt)φ
∗
t = ψ
∗
t+1φ
∗
t ,
hence (φt/φ
∗
t )ψ
∗
t+1φ
∗
t = ψ
∗
t+1φt of the option will be cancelled by the seller at t.
Altogether, ψtφ
∗
t + ψ
∗
t+1φt of the option will be terminated at t due to exercise
or cancellation, leaving
ψ∗t φ
∗
t − ψtφ
∗
t − ψ
∗
t+1φt =
(
ψt + ψ
∗
t+1
) (
φt + φ
∗
t+1
)
− ψt
(
φt + φ
∗
t+1
)
− ψ∗t+1φt
= ψ∗t+1φ
∗
t+1
of the option neither exercised nor cancelled before or at t, to be carried forward
to time t+ 1. This completes the induction.
Remark 5 The minimum ψ ∧ φ of mixed stopping times ψ, φ ∈ X can be
defined as
(ψ ∧ φ)t := ψtφ
∗
t + ψ
∗
t+1φt
for each t = 0, . . . , T ; see [Kif13b]. The above argument shows that a game
option with gradual exercise and cancellation will be terminated according to
the mixed stopping time ψ ∧ φ.
On each trading date t = 0, . . . , T , since ψtφ
∗
t of the option is to be exercised
and ψ∗t+1φt of the option to be cancelled, the seller will be delivering to the buyer
the portfolio
Gφ,ψt := ψtφ
∗
tYt + ψ
∗
t+1φtXt,
where Y = (Yt)
T
t=0 and X = (Xt)
T
t=0 are the exercise and cancellation processes
characterising the game option, that is, Rd-valued adapted processes that sat-
isfy (5). Clearly, Gφ,ψ = (Gφ,ψt )
T
t=0 is an R
d-valued adapted process, which we
shall be referring to as the payoff process for the game option.
Definition 6 A game (or Israeli) option (Y,X) with gradual exercise and can-
cellation is a derivative security that can be exercised according to a mixed
stopping time ψ ∈ X chosen by the buyer or cancelled according to a mixed
stopping time φ ∈ X chosen by the seller, giving the buyer the right to receive
and obliging the seller to deliver the portfolio Gφ,ψt = ψtφ
∗
tYt + ψ
∗
t+1φtXt on
each trading date t = 0, . . . , T .
Remark 7 In contrast to the above payoff process Gφ,ψt , Kifer [Kif13b] refers
to the random variable
Qφ,ψ :=
T∑
s=0
T∑
t=0
φsψtQs,t
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as the ‘payoff’ of a game option with exercise and cancellation according to
mixed stopping times φ, ψ ∈ X , without specifying the time instant when this
portfolio should be changing hands. However, the payoff of such an option
should not be a single random variable but in fact an adapted process repre-
senting the flow of portfolios to be delivered on each trading date t = 0, . . . , T .
We observe that
Qφ,ψ =
T∑
t=0
Gφ,ψt ,
i.e. Qφ,ψ happens to be the total of all the G
φ,ψ
t for t = 0, . . . , T .
In the present paper Qφ,ψ will prove useful in a different role. Namely,
identifying the mixed stopping time χt ∈ X with a deterministic time t, we
are going to use Qφ,χt for t = 0, . . . , T as the payoff process of an American
option with gradual exercise and invoke the results of [RouZas14] to establish a
probabilistic representation of the seller’s price for a game option under gradual
exercise and cancellation; see Lemma 15 and Theorem 16. Similarly, in the
buyer’s case, we are going to use an American option with gradual exercise and
payoff process −Qχt,ψ for t = 0, . . . , T ; see Lemma 24 and Theorem 25.
4 Seller’s price and superhedging strategies
The seller of a game option (Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancellation needs
to hedge against any mixed stopping time ψ ∈ X chosen by the buyer to
exercise the option. The seller can do this by following a trading strategy
uψ = (uψt )
T
t=0 ∈ Φ, which may depend on ψ. Since u
ψ
t denotes a portfolio held
over time step t, that is, between times t−1 and t, it follows that uψt may depend
on the values ψ0, . . . , ψt−1 known to the seller at time t− 1, when this portfolio
is to be created, but not on the yet unknown (to the seller) values ψt, . . . , ψT .
This is the reason for the non-anticipation condition (7) in Definition 8.
In addition to choosing the trading strategy uψ ∈ Φ, the seller can select a
mixed stopping time φ ∈ X to cancel the option, and must be able to deliver
the portfolio Gφ,ψt on each date t = 0, . . . , T without injecting any additional
wealth into the strategy. This justifies the rebalancing condition (6).
Definition 8 For a game option (Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancellation,
a seller’s superhedging strategy is a pair (φ, u), where φ ∈ X and u : X → Φ,
that satisfies the rebalancing condition
∀ψ ∈ X ∀t = 0, . . . , T : uψt −G
φ,ψ
t − u
ψ
t+1 ∈ Kt (6)
and the non-anticipation condition
∀ψ, ψ′ ∈ X ∀t = 0, . . . , T :
⋂t−1
s=0{ψs = ψ
′
s} ⊆ {u
ψ
t = u
ψ′
t }. (7)
The family of such strategies will be denoted by Φa(Y,X).
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The least expensive (in a particular currency j) seller’s superhedging strategy
gives rise to the seller’s price of the option.
Definition 9 The seller’s (or ask) price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of a game
option (Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancellation is defined as
piaj (Y,X) := inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃(φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
.
4.1 Seller’s pricing algorithm
The following is an iterative construction of the set of initial endowments that
allow superhedging the seller’s position in a game option with gradual exercise
and cancellation.
Construction 10 Construct adapted sequences Yat ,X
a
t ,V
a
t ,W
a
t ,Z
a
t for t =
0, . . . , T as follows. First, put
Yat := Yt +Qt, X
a
t := Xt +Qt
for all t = 0, . . . , T and
WaT := V
a
T := LT , Z
a
T := Y
a
T .
Then, for t = T − 1, . . . , 0 define by backward induction
Wat := Z
a
t+1 ∩ Lt,
Vat :=W
a
t +Qt,
Zat := conv{V
a
t ,X
a
t } ∩ Y
a
t ,
where conv{Vat ,X
a
t } is the convex hull of V
a
t and X
a
t .
By a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 5.1 in [RouZas14], it
follows that Zat are polyhedral convex sets for all t. We shall see that Z
a
0 is the
set of initial endowments that allow the seller to superhedge their position in
the game option (Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancellation. Once Za0 has
been constructed, the following result can be used to obtain the seller’s price of
the option.
Theorem 11 The seller’s price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of a game option (Y,X)
with gradual exercise and cancellation can be expressed as
piaj (Y,X) = min
{
x ∈ R |xej ∈ Za0
}
.
To prove this theorem, we introduce an auxiliary family Λa(Y,X), the el-
ements of which can be thought of as the strategies superhedging the seller’s
position in a game option with gradual cancellation, instant (rather than grad-
ual) exercise and deferred (rather than immediate) solvency. The theorem and
the following propositions are proved in the Appendix, Section 7.
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Definition 12 We define Λa(Y,X) as the family consisting of all pairs (φ, z),
where φ ∈ X and z ∈ Φ, that satisfy the conditions
zt − φtXt − zt+1 ∈ Qt for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
zt − φ
∗
tYt ∈ Qt for all t = 0, . . . , T.
According to the next proposition, Za0 coincides with the set of initial en-
dowments for the strategies in Λa(Y,X).
Proposition 13
Za0 =
{
z0 ∈ R
d | (φ, z) ∈ Λa(Y,X)
}
.
We also claim that the set of initial endowments for the strategies in Λa(Y,X)
coincides with that for the strategies in Φa(Y,X).
Proposition 14{
z0 ∈ R
d | (φ, z) ∈ Λa(Y,X)
}
=
{
u0 ∈ R
d | (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X)
}
.
It follows from Propositions 13 and 14 that Za0 is the family of initial endow-
ments for all strategies superhedging the seller’s position in a game option with
gradual exercise and cancellation. This is what’s needed to prove Theorem 11,
which links the seller’s price piaj (Y,X) with Z
a
0 . Full details can be found in the
Appendix, Section 7.
4.2 Seller’s price representation
In this section we obtain a dual representation of the seller’s price for game
options with gradual exercise and cancellation. This relies on a similar result
established in [RouZas14] for American options with gradual exercise; see The-
orem 4.
Observe that, by Definition 9,
piaj (Y,X) = inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃(φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
= inf
φ∈χ
inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃u : (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X), xej = u0
}
.
Hence, as a consequence of Lemma 15 below, together with Definition 3, we
have
piaj (Y,X) = inf
φ∈χ
inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃z ∈ Ψa(Qφ, · ) : xe
j = z0
}
= inf
φ∈χ
paj(Qφ, · ),
where Qφ, · = (Qφ,t)
T
t=0 with
Qφ,t := Qφ,χt for t = 0, . . . , T
is the payoff process for an American option with gradual exercise, and where
paj(Qφ, · ) is the seller’s price of such an American option.
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Lemma 15 For any φ ∈ X
{u0 | (φ, u) ∈ Φ
a(Y,X)} = {z0 | z ∈ Ψ
a(Qφ, · )} ,
where Qφ, · = (Qφ,t)
T
t=0 is the payoff process of an American option.
The lemma is proved in the Appendix, Section 7. It turns out that the
infimum over φ ∈ χ in
piaj (Y,X) = inf
φ∈χ
paj(Qφ, · )
is, in fact, a minimum. Moreover, paj(Qφ, · ) can be represented as in Theorem 4.
This leads to the following representation.
Theorem 16 The seller’s price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of a game option (Y,X)
with gradual exercise and cancellation can be represented as
piaj (Y,X) = min
φ∈X
max
ψ∈X
max
(Q,S)∈P¯d
j
(ψ)
EQ((Qφ, · · S)ψ).
The details of the proof can be found, once again, in the Appendix, Section 7.
5 Buyer’s price and superhedging strategies
The buyer of a game option (Y,X) will be able to select a mixed stopping
time ψ ∈ X to exercise the option, and can follow a trading strategy uφ =
(uφt )
T
t=0 ∈ Φ, which may depend on the cancellation time φ ∈ X chosen by
the seller. On each date t = 0, . . . , T the buyer will be taking delivery of
the portfolio Gφ,ψt and can rebalance the current position u
φ
t in the strategy
into uφt+1 in a self-financing way, i.e. without injecting any additional wealth.
The portfolio uφt created by the buyer at time t− 1 may depend on the seller’s
cancellation strategy φ0, . . . , φt−1 up to and including time t − 1, but not on
the values φt, . . . , φT , as these will not yet be known to the buyer at time t− 1.
These considerations lead to the following definition.
Definition 17 For a game option (Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancellation,
a buyer’s superhedging strategy is a pair (ψ, u), where ψ ∈ X and u : X → Φ,
that satisfies the rebalancing condition
∀φ ∈ X ∀t = 0, . . . , T : uφt +G
φ,ψ
t − u
φ
t+1 ∈ Kt (8)
and the non-anticipation condition
∀φ, φ′ ∈ X ∀t = 0, . . . , T :
⋂t−1
s=0{φs = φ
′
s} ⊆ {u
φ
t = u
φ′
t }. (9)
The family of such strategies will be denoted by Φb(Y,X).
The buyer’s price of the game option in currency j can be understood as the
largest amount in that currency which can be raised against a long position in
the option used as surety. The precise definition is as follows.
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Definition 18 The buyer’s (or bid) price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of a game
option (Y,X) under gradual exercise and cancellation is defined as
pibj (Y,X) := sup
{
−x ∈ R | ∃(ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
.
5.1 Buyer’s pricing algorithm
As is well known, there is a symmetry between the buyer’s and seller’s super-
hedging and pricing problems for a European option. The symmetry consists,
essentially, in reversing the sign of the payoff while also reversing the roles of
buyer and seller. Hence, solving the seller’s problem also yields a solution to
the buyer’s problem, and vice versa. However, for an American option this
symmetry is broken, and one needs to solve the buyer’s and seller’s problems
separately; see for example [RouZas14] or [RouZas16].
On first sight, it might appear that the symmetry between the buyer and
seller might be restored in the case of a game option. However, in fact, this is
not so when the buyer has priority to exercise the option before the seller can
cancel it. Reversing their roles would give priority to the seller. Combined with
condition (5), this breaks the symmetry, and so a specific solution to the buyer’s
problem is needed. This is facilitated by the following construction.
Construction 19 Construct adapted sequences Ybt ,X
b
t ,V
b
t ,W
b
t ,Z
b
t for t =
0, . . . , T as follows. First, put
Ybt := −Yt +Qt, X
b
t := −Xt +Qt
for all t = 0, . . . , T and
WbT := V
b
T := LT , Z
b
T := Y
b
T .
Then, for t = T − 1, . . . , 0 define by backward induction
Wbt := Z
b
t+1 ∩ Lt,
Vbt :=W
b
t +Qt,
Zbt := conv{V
b
t ∩ X
b
t ,Y
b
t }.
As compared to the seller’s Construction 10, apart from swapping the payoff
processes Y,X for −X,−Y , which would have been enough had there been a
simple symmetry between the buyer and seller, the operations of intersection
and convex hull are taken in the reverse order in the last line of this construction.
The proofs of the results below concerning the buyer’s case resemble those
for the seller, but certain details follow a diverse pattern to account for the
differences between the seller’s and buyer’s pricing constructions.
Just as in the seller’s case, the same argument as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 5.1 in [RouZas14] shows that the Zbt are polyhedral convex sets. Moreover,
we shall see that Zb0 plays a similar role for the buyer as Z
a
0 does for the seller,
namely it is the set of all initial endowments allowing the option buyer to su-
perhedge their position. This leads to the following result.
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Theorem 20 The buyer’s price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of a game option (Y,X)
with gradual exercise and cancellation can be expressed as
pibj (Y,X) = max
{
−x ∈ R |xej ∈ Zb0
}
.
To prove this theorem we need the following family Λb(Y,X), the elements
of which can be seen as strategies superhedging the buyer’s position in a game
option with instant (rather than gradual) cancellation, gradual exercise and
deferred (rather than immediate) solvency.
Definition 21 We define Λb(Y,X) as the family consisting of all pairs (ψ, z),
where ψ ∈ X and z ∈ Φ, that satisfy the conditions
zt + ψtYt − zt+1 ∈ Qt for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
zt + ψtY + ψ
∗
t+1Xt ∈ Qt for all t = 0, . . . , T.
The next two results are similar to Propositions 13 and 14. First, Zb0 is shown
to be equal to the set of initial endowments for the strategies in Λb(Y,X).
Proposition 22
Zb0 =
{
z0 ∈ R
d | (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X)
}
.
The set of initial endowments for the strategies in Λb(Y,X) is then shown
to coincide with that for the strategies in Φb(Y,X).
Proposition 23{
z0 ∈ R
d | (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X)
}
=
{
u0 ∈ R
d | (ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X)
}
.
The proofs of these two propositions are in the Appendix, Section 7. Once
these results have been established, proving that Zb0 is the set of initial endow-
ments for the strategies in Φb(Y,X), Theorem 20 follows; for details, see the
proof in the Appendix, Section 7.
5.2 Buyer’s price representation
In this section we obtain a representation of the buyer’s price of a game option
with gradual exercise, by exploiting a link with the price of an American option
with gradual exercise and payoff process −Q · ,ψ = (−Qt,ψ)
T
t=0 defined for any
ψ ∈ χ, where
Qt,ψ := Qχt,ψ for t = 0, . . . , T.
Such a link is furnished by the next lemma.
Lemma 24 For any ψ ∈ X{
u0 | (ψ, u) ∈ Φ
b(Y,X)
}
= {z0 | z ∈ Ψ
a(−Q · ,ψ)} ,
where −Q · ,ψ = (−Qt,ψ)
T
t=0 is the payoff process of an American option.
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Figure 1: Game option in binary two-step two-currency model
With the aid of this lemma, in a similar manner as in Section 4.2, we can
establish the following representation of the buyer’s price.
Theorem 25 The buyer’s price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of a game option (Y,X)
with gradual exercise and cancellation can be represented as
pibj (Y,X) = max
ψ∈X
min
φ∈X
min
(Q,S)∈P¯d
j
(φ)
EQ((Q · ,ψ · S)φ).
The proofs of Lemma 24 and Theorem 25 can be found in the Appendix,
Section 7.
6 Example
A game option (Y,X) in a binary two-step two-currency model is presented in
Figure 1. The model is recombinant; the option payoff is path-independent and
has no cancellation penalties at time 2. The model has transaction costs only
at the node u at time 1.
Constructions 3.1 and 3.4 of [Rou16] give the bid-ask spread of the game
option (Y,X) with instant exercise and cancellation in terms of currency 2 to
be [3.2, 5]. We will show below that the bid-ask spread of (Y,X) with gradual
exercise and cancellation is
[pib2 (Y,X), pi
a
2(Y,X)] = [
11
3 ,
14
3 ] ≈ [3.6667, 4.6667]⊂ [3.2, 5].
(Indeed the bid and ask prices of (Y,X) can be read off the vertical axes in
Figures 3 and 5 below.) Thus gradual exercise and cancellation leads to a
smaller bid-ask spread in this example.
Let us use Construction 10 to find the set Za0 of initial endowments that
allow the seller to superhedge (Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancellation. At
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time t = 2 we have
Zauu2 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 14x1 + x2 ≥ 9},
Zaud2 = Z
adu
2 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 10x1 + x2 ≥ 4},
Zadd2 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 4x1 + x2 ≥ 0}.
Figure 2 illustrates the construction at time t = 1 at the node u, which results
in
Zau1 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 14x1 + x2 ≥ 6, 585 x
1 + x2 ≥ 6, 10x1 + x2 ≥ 4}.
Similar considerations at the node d give
Zad1 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 6x1 + x2 ≥ 43}.
The construction at time t = 0 gives
Za0 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 10x1 + x2 ≥ 143 },
as illustrated in Figure 3.
A superhedging strategy for the seller starting from the initial endowment
(0, pia2(Y,X)) can be constructed by following similar lines as in the proof of
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Proposition 13 to assemble (φ, za) ∈ Λa(Y,X), and then converting it into a
superhedging strategy (φ, ua) ∈ Φa(Y,X) using the arguments in the proof of
Proposition 14. We illustrate the first part of the process here for the sce-
nario uu. Define first za0 :=
(
0, 143
)
; it is clear from Figure 3 that za0 /∈ X
a
0 ,
leading to φ0 := 0. Choosing z
a
1 :=
(
5
6 ,−
11
3
)
∈ Wa0 then gives that
za0 − φ0X0 − z
a
1 = z
a
0 − z
a
1 ∈ Q0.
Figure 2 shows that za1 ∈ Z
a
1 ⊂ Y
a
1 . It also shows that defining φ
u
1 :=
2
3 and
zau2 :=
(
5
4 ,−
17
2
)
leads to
za1 = φ
u
1 (0, 6) + (1 − φ
u
1)z
au
2 ,
with (0, 6) ∈ X au1 and z
au
2 ∈ V
au
1 = W
au
1 ⊂ Z
auu
2 = Y
auu
2 . Thus this strategy
corresponds to cancellation of 13 of the option at time 1 at the node u and the
remaining φuu1 :=
1
3 at time 2.
The set of superhedging strategies for the buyer of (Y,X) can be computed
by following Construction 19. At time t = 2,
Zbuu2 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 14x1 + x2 ≥ −9},
Zbud2 = Z
bdu
2 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 10x1 + x2 ≥ −4},
Zbdd2 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 4x1 + x2 ≥ 0}.
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The construction at time t = 1 at the node u gives
Zbu1 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 14x1 + x2 ≥ −6, 10x1 + x2 ≥ −4},
as illustrated in Figure 4. Similar considerations at the node d result in
Zbd1 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 6x1 + x2 ≥ − 43}.
Figure 5 demonstrates the construction at time t = 0, which leads to
Za0 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 10x1 + x2 ≥ − 113 }.
Similarly to the seller’s case, the construction of a superhedging strategy
for the buyer starting from the initial endowment
(
0,−pib2 (Y,X)
)
involves two
steps, namely assembling (ψ, zb) ∈ Λb(Y,X) using the construction in the proof
of Proposition 22, and then converting it into a superhedging strategy (ψ, ub) ∈
Φb(Y,X) following the lines in the proof of Proposition 23. Let us consider again
the first step for the scenario uu. Define zb0 :=
(
0,− 113
)
; then Figure 5 shows that
zb0 ∈ X
b
0 but z
b
0 /∈ Y
b
0 , which leads to ψ0 := 0. Choosing z
b
1 :=
(
− 712 ,
13
6
)
∈ Wb0
ensures that
zb0 − ψ0Y0 − z
b
1 = z
b
0 − z
b
1 ∈ Q0.
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Figure 4 shows that zb1 ∈ X
bu
1 ; however z
b
1 /∈ Y
bu
1 again leads to the choice
ψu1 := 0. Moreover z
b
1 ∈ W
bu
1 , so choosing z
bu
2 := z
b
1 gives
zb1 − ψ
u
1Y
u
1 − z
bu
2 = 0 ∈ Q
u
1 .
Note finally that zbu2 ∈ Z
buu
2 = Y
buu
2 , which leads to ψ
uu
2 := 1. Thus this
strategy corresponds to exercising the entire option at time 2 on the node uu.
7 Appendix: proofs
Proof of Theorem 11. By Definition 9,
piaj (Y,X) = inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃(φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
.
Hence, according to Proposition 14,
piaj (Y,X) = inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃(φ, u) ∈ Λa(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
and, by Proposition 13,
piaj (Y,X) = inf
{
x ∈ R |xej ∈ Za0
}
.
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Because Za0 is a polyhedral set, it is closed. It follows that
{
x ∈ R |xej ∈ Za0
}
is closed. It is non-empty and bounded below because xej ∈ Za0 for any x ∈ R
large enough, and xej /∈ Za0 for any x ∈ R small enough. It follows that the
infimum is in fact a minimum.
Proof of Proposition 13. Let a ∈ Za0 . We construct a mixed stopping time
φ ∈ X together with the corresponding process φ∗ and a strategy z ∈ Φ by
induction. First we put φ∗0 := 1 and z0 := a. Clearly, z0 ∈ φ
∗
0Z
a
0 . Now suppose
that for some t = 0, . . . , T−1 we have constructed zt and φ
∗
t such that zt ∈ φ
∗
tZ
a
t .
It follows that zt ∈ φ
∗
tY
a
t , hence
zt − φ
∗
tYt ∈ Qt.
It also follows that zt ∈ φ
∗
t conv{V
a
t ,X
a
t }, hence there exist λt ∈ [0, 1], vt ∈ V
a
t
and xt ∈ X
a
t such that zt = φ
∗
t ((1 − λt)vt + λtxt). We put φt := φ
∗
tλt, and
then φ∗t+1 := φ
∗
t − φt = φ
∗
t (1 − λt), so zt = φ
∗
t+1vt + φtxt. Since xt ∈ X
a
t and
vt ∈ V
a
t , it follows that xt − Xt ∈ Qt and there is zt+1 ∈ φ
∗
t+1W
a
t such that
φ∗t+1vt − zt+1 ∈ Qt. As a result,
zt − φtXt − zt+1 = φ
∗
t+1vt + φtxt − φtXt − zt+1
= φ∗t+1vt − zt+1 + φt (xt −Xt) ∈ Qt.
Since Wat ⊆ Z
a
t+1, it also follows that zt+1 ∈ φ
∗
t+1Z
a
t+1. Finally, given that
zT ∈ φ
∗
TZ
a
T , we get zT ∈ φ
∗
TY
a
T , so zT − φ
∗
TYT ∈ QT , and we put φT := φ
∗
T ,
φ∗T+1 := 0 and zT+1 := 0. We have constructed (φ, z) ∈ Λ
a(Y,X) such that
a = z0.
Conversely, we take any (φ, z) ∈ Λa(Y,X), and want to show that z0 ∈ Z
a
0 .
More generally, we will show by backward induction that for each t = 0, . . . , T
zt ∈
{
φ∗tZ
a
t on {φ
∗
t > 0}
Qt on {φ
∗
t = 0}
. (10)
Since zT − φ
∗
TYT = zT − φTYT ∈ QT , it follows that
zT ∈ φ
∗
TYT +QT =
{
φ∗TY
a
T on {φ
∗
T > 0}
QT on {φ
∗
T = 0}
=
{
φ∗TZ
a
T on {φ
∗
T > 0}
QT on {φ
∗
T = 0}
.
Next, suppose that (10) holds for some t = 1, . . . , T . Since z is predictable, it
follows that zt ∈ Lt−1, so
zt ∈
{
φ∗t (Z
a
t ∩ Lt−1) on {φ
∗
t > 0}
Qt ∩ Lt−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0}
⊆
{
φ∗tW
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0}
.
Hence, using
zt−1 − φt−1Xt−1 − zt ∈ Qt−1,
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we obtain
zt−1 − φt−1Xt−1 ∈ zt +Qt−1
⊆
{
φ∗tW
a
t−1 +Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 +Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0}
=
{
φ∗tV
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0}
.
It follows that
zt−1 ∈
{
φt−1Xt−1 + φ
∗
tV
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t > 0}
φt−1Xt−1 +Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0}
=


φ∗tV
a
t−1 + φt−1X
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t > 0}
φt−1X
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0, φt−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0, φt−1 = 0}
=
{
φ∗tV
a
t−1 + φt−1X
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 = 0}
⊆
{
φ∗t conv
{
Vat−1,X
a
t−1
}
on {φ∗t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 = 0}
.
Moreover, sice zt−1 − φ
∗
t−1Yt−1 ∈ Qt−1, it follows that
zt−1 ∈ φ
∗
t−1Yt−1 +Qt−1 =
{
φ∗tY
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 = 0}
.
As a result,
zt−1 ∈
{
φ∗t conv
{
Vat−1,X
a
t−1
}
∩ φ∗tY
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 = 0}
=
{
φ∗tZ
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 = 0}
,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 14. Suppose that (φ, z) ∈ Λa(Y,X). Then, for each
t = 0, . . . , T − 1
zt − φtXt − zt+1 ∈ Qt,
so there is a liquidation strategy ytt+1, . . . , y
t
T+1 starting from zt − φtYt − zt+1
at time t. We also put yTT+1 := 0 for notational convenience. Moreover,
zt − φ
∗
tYt ∈ Qt for each t = 0, . . . , T,
so there is a liquidation strategy xtt+1, . . . , x
t
T+1 starting from zt−φ
∗
tYt at time t.
For each ψ ∈ X we put
uψ0 := z0,
uψt := ψ
∗
t zt +
t−1∑
s=0
ψ∗s+1y
s
t +
t−1∑
s=0
ψsx
s
t for t = 1, . . . , T + 1.
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This defines u : X → Φ, which satisfies the non-anticipation condition (7).
Moreover, for each ψ ∈ X and for each t = 0, . . . , T ,
uψt −G
φ,ψ
t − u
ψ
t+1
= ψ∗t zt +
t−1∑
s=0
ψ∗s+1y
s
t +
t−1∑
s=0
ψsx
s
t − ψtφ
∗
tYt − ψ
∗
t+1φtXt
− ψ∗t+1zt+1 −
t∑
s=0
ψ∗s+1y
s
t+1 −
t∑
s=0
ψsx
s
t+1
= ψ∗t+1
(
zt − φtXt − zt+1 − y
t
t+1
)
+ ψt
(
zt − φ
∗
tYt − x
t
t+1
)
+
t−1∑
s=0
ψ∗s+1
(
yst − y
s
t+1
)
+
t−1∑
s=0
ψs
(
xst − x
s
t+1
)
∈ ψ∗t+1Kt + ψtKt +
t−1∑
s=0
ψ∗s+1Kt +
t−1∑
s=0
ψsKt ⊆ Kt.
This means that (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X), with z0 = u0.
Conversely, suppose that (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X). Then we put
z := uχ
T
.
It follows that for each t = 0, . . . , T − 1
zt − φtXt − zt+1 = u
χT
t +G
φ,χT
t − u
χT
t+1 ∈ Kt ⊆ Qt
since
Gφ,χ
T
t = χ
T
t φ
∗
tYt + χ
T∗
t+1φtXt = φtXt.
Next, take any t = 0, . . . , T . Then χTs = χ
t
s = 0 for each s = 0, . . . , t − 1, and
because u satisfies the non-anticipation condition (7), we have zt = u
χT
t = u
χt
t .
Since χtt = 1, χ
t∗
t+1 = 0 and
Gφ,χ
t
t = χ
t
tφ
∗
tYt + χ
t∗
t+1φtXt = φ
∗
tYt,
it means that
zt − φ
∗
tYt − u
χt
t+1 = u
χt
t +G
φ,χt
t − u
χt
t+1 ∈ Kt ⊆ Qt. (11)
Moreover, for each s = t+ 1, . . . , T we have χts = χ
t∗
s+1 = 0 and
Gφ,χ
t
s = χ
t
sφ
∗
sYs + χ
t∗
s+1φtXt = 0,
hence
uχ
t
s − u
χt
s+1 = u
χt
s +G
φ,χt
s − u
χt
s+1 ∈ Ks ⊆ Qs.
We can verify by backward induction that uχ
t
s+1 ∈ Qs for each s = t, . . . , T .
Clearly, uχ
t
T+1 = 0 ∈ QT . Now suppose that u
χt
s+1 ∈ Qs for some s = t+1, . . . , T .
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It follows that uχ
t
s = (u
χt
s − u
χt
s+1) + u
χt
s+1 ∈ Qs + Qs = Qs. By predictability,
uχ
t
s ∈ Ls−1, so we can conclude that u
χt
s ∈ Qs ∩Ls−1 ⊆ Qs−1, which completes
the backward induction argument. In particular, we have shown that uχ
t
t+1 ∈ Qt.
Together with (11), this shows that
zt − φ
∗
tYt ∈ Qt
for each t = 0, . . . , T . As a result, (φ, z) ∈ Λa(Y,X) with z0 = u0, which
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 15. Take any u ∈ Φ such that (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X). Observe
that
Qφ,t = Qφ,χt =
T∑
s=0
T∑
u=0
φsχ
t
uQs,u =
T∑
s=0
φs1{s≥t}Yt +
T∑
s=0
φs1{s<t}Xs
= φ∗tYt +
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs
and define z : X → Φ such that
zψt := u
ψ
t + ψ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs (12)
for any ψ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T + 1. Then z satisfies the non-anticipation
condition (4), z0 = u0, and it also satisfies the rebalancing condition (3) for
an American option with payoff process Qφ, · since for any ψ ∈ X and any
t = 0, . . . , T
zψt − ψtQφ,t − z
ψ
t+1
=
(
uψt + ψ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs
)
− ψt
(
φ∗tYt +
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs
)
−
(
uψt+1 + ψ
∗
t+1
t∑
s=0
φsXs
)
= uψt − ψtφ
∗
tYt − ψ
∗
t+1φtXt − u
ψ
t+1
= uψt −G
φ,ψ
t − u
ψ
t+1 ∈ Kt.
Conversely, take any z ∈ Ψa(Qφ, · ) and define u : X → Φ such that
uψt := z
ψ
t − ψ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs
for any ψ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T + 1. Then u satisfies the non-anticipation
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condition (7), u0 = z0, and
uψt −G
φ,ψ
t − u
ψ
t+1
=
(
zψt − ψ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs
)
−
(
ψtφ
∗
tYt + ψ
∗
t+1φtXt
)
−
(
zψt+1 − ψ
∗
t+1
t∑
s=0
φsXs
)
= zψt − ψt
(
φ∗tYt +
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs
)
− zψt+1
= zψt − ψtQφ,t − z
ψ
t+1 ∈ Kt
for any ψ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T , so the rebalancing condition (6) holds.
The lemma follows because (12) defines a one-to-one map between strategies
z ∈ Ψa(Qφ, · ) and strategies u such that (φ, u) ∈ Φ
a(Y,X) with u0 = z0.
Proof of Theorem 16. According to Definition 9,
piaj (Y,X) = inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃(φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
. (13)
By Theorem 11, piaj (Y,X)e
j ∈ Za0 . Hence, by Proposition 13, there is a (φ, z) ∈
Λa(Y,X) such that piaj (Y,X)e
j = z0. It follows by Proposition 14 that there is
a (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) such that piaj (Y,X)e
j = u0, so the infimum in (13) is in fact
a minimum,
piaj (Y,X) = min
{
x ∈ R | ∃(φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
.
As a result, according to Lemma 15 and Definition 3,
piaj (Y,X) = min
{
x ∈ R | ∃φ ∈ χ∃z ∈ Ψa(Qφ, · ) : xe
j = z0
}
= min
φ∈χ
inf
{
x ∈ R |∃z ∈ Ψa(Qφ, · ) : xe
j = z0
}
= min
φ∈χ
paj(Qφ, · ),
where paj(Qφ, · ) is the seller’s price of an American option with gradual exercise
and payoff process Qφ, · , which can be expressed as
paj(Qφ, · ) = max
ψ∈X
max
(Q,S)∈P¯d
j
(ψ)
EQ((Qφ, · · S)ψ)
by Theorem 4. It follows that
piaj (Y,X) = min
φ∈X
max
ψ∈X
max
(Q,S)∈P¯d
j
(ψ)
EQ((Qφ, · · S)ψ),
completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 20. Using Definition 18 and Propositions 22 and 23, we
obtain
pibj (Y,X) = sup
{
−x ∈ R | ∃(ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
= sup
{
−x ∈ R | ∃(ψ, u) ∈ Λb(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
= sup
{
−x ∈ R |xej ∈ Zb0
}
.
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Being a polyhedral set, Zb0 is closed, hence
{
−x ∈ R |xej ∈ Zb0
}
is closed. More-
over,
{
−x ∈ R |xej ∈ Zb0
}
is non-empty and bounded above because xej ∈ Zb0
for any x ∈ R large enough and xej /∈ Zb0 for any x ∈ R small enough, so the
supremum is in fact a maximum.
Proof of Proposition 22. Let a ∈ Zb0 . We construct a mixed stopping time
ψ ∈ X and a strategy z ∈ Φ by induction. First we put ψ∗0 := 1 and z0 := a.
Clearly, z0 ∈ ψ
∗
0Z
b
0 . Next, suppose that zt ∈ ψ
∗
tZ
b
t for some t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Then zt ∈ ψ
∗
t conv{V
b
t ∩ X
b
t ,Y
b
t }, so there exist λt ∈ [0, 1], vt ∈ V
b
t ∩ X
b
t and
yt ∈ Y
b
t such that zt = ψ
∗
t ((1 − λt)vt + λtyt). We put ψt := ψ
∗
t λt, and then
ψ∗t+1 := ψ
∗
t − ψt = ψ
∗
t (1 − λt), so zt = ψ
∗
t+1vt + ψtyt. Because vt ∈ X
b
t and
yt ∈ Y
b
t , we have vt +Xt ∈ Qt and yt + Yt ∈ Qt. It follows that
zt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt = ψ
∗
t+1vt + ψtyt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt
= ψ∗t+1(vt +Xt) + ψt(yt + Yt)
∈ ψ∗t+1Qt + ψtQt ⊆ Qt.
Since vt ∈ V
b
t , there is a zt+1 ∈ ψ
∗
t+1W
b
t such that ψ
∗
t+1vt−zt+1 ∈ Qt. It follows
that
zt + ψtYt − zt+1 = ψ
∗
t+1vt + ψtyt + ψtYt − zt+1
= (ψ∗t+1vt − zt+1) + ψt(yt + Yt) ∈ Qt.
Since Wbt ⊆ Z
b
t+1, it also follows that zt+1 ∈ ψ
∗
t+1Z
b
t+1. Finally, given that
zT ∈ ψ
∗
TZ
b
T = ψ
∗
TY
b
T , we get zT + ψTYT = zT + ψ
∗
TYT ∈ QT . Putting and
ψT := ψ
∗
T , ψ
∗
T+1 := 0 and zT+1 := 0, we obtain
zT + ψTYT + ψ
∗
T+1XT ∈ QT .
We have constructed (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X) such that a = z0.
Conversely, we take any (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X), and want to show that z0 ∈ Z
b
0 .
This a consequence of the following fact, which will be proved by backward
induction: for each t = 0, . . . , T
zt ∈
{
ψ∗tZ
b
t on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
. (14)
We start the proof with t = T . Since zT +ψ
∗
TYT = zT +ψTYT +ψ
∗
T+1XT ∈ QT ,
it follows that indeed
zT ∈ −ψ
∗
TYT +QT =
{
ψ∗TY
b
T on {ψ
∗
T > 0}
QT on {ψ
∗
T = 0}
=
{
ψ∗TZ
b
T on {ψ
∗
T > 0}
QT on {ψ
∗
T = 0}
.
Next, suppose that (14) holds for some t = 1, . . . , T . Since z is predictable, it
follows that zt ∈ Lt−1, so
zt ∈
{
ψ∗t (Z
b
t ∩ Lt−1) on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt ∩ Lt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
⊆
{
ψ∗tW
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
.
25
Hence, using
zt−1 + ψt−1Yt−1 − zt ∈ Qt−1,
we obtain
zt−1 + ψt−1Yt−1 ∈ zt +Qt−1
⊆
{
ψ∗tW
b
t−1 +Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 +Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
=
{
ψ∗t V
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
.
Moreover, since
zt−1 + ψt−1Yt−1 + ψ
∗
tXt−1 ∈ Qt−1,
we obtain
zt−1 + ψt−1Yt−1 ∈ Qt−1 − ψ
∗
tXt−1 =
{
ψ∗tX
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
.
It follows that
zt−1 + ψt−1Yt−1 ∈
{
ψ∗t (V
b
t−1 ∩ X
b
t−1) on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
,
and so
zt−1 ∈
{
ψ∗t (V
b
t−1 ∩ X
b
t−1) + ψt−1Yt−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 + ψt−1Yt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
⊆
{
ψ∗t (V
b
t−1 ∩ X
b
t−1) + ψt−1Y
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 + ψt−1Y
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
=


ψ∗t (V
b
t−1 ∩ X
b
t−1) + ψt−1Y
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
ψt−1Y
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0, ψ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t−1 = 0}
=
{
ψ∗t (V
b
t−1 ∩ X
b
t−1) + ψt−1Y
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t−1 = 0}
⊆
{
ψ∗t−1 conv
{
Vbt−1 ∩ X
b
t−1,Y
b
t−1
}
on {ψ∗t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t−1 = 0}
=
{
ψ∗t−1Z
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t−1 = 0}
,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 23. Suppose that (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X). Then, for each
t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
zt + ψtYt − zt+1 ∈ Qt,
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so there is a liquidation strategy ytt+1, . . . , y
t
T+1 starting from zt + ψtYt − zt+1
at time t. We also put yTT+1 := 0 for notational convenience. Moreover,
zt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt ∈ Qt for each t = 0, . . . , T,
so there is a liquidation strategy xtt+1, . . . , x
t
T+1 starting from zt+ψtYt+ψ
∗
t+1Xt
at time t. For each φ ∈ X we put
uφ0 := z0,
uφt := φ
∗
t zt +
t−1∑
s=0
φ∗s+1y
s
t +
t−1∑
s=0
φsx
s
t for t = 1, . . . , T + 1.
This defines u : X → Φ, which satisfies the non-anticipation condition (9).
Moreover, for each ψ ∈ X and for each t = 0, . . . , T
uφt +G
φ,ψ
t − u
φ
t+1
= φ∗t zt +
t−1∑
s=0
φ∗s+1y
s
t +
t−1∑
s=0
φsx
s
t + ψtφ
∗
tYt + ψ
∗
t+1φtXt
− φ∗t+1zt+1 −
t∑
s=0
φ∗s+1y
s
t+1 −
t∑
s=0
φsx
s
t+1
= φ∗t+1
(
zt + ψtYt − zt+1 − y
t
t+1
)
+ φt
(
zt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt − x
t
t+1
)
+
t−1∑
s=0
φ∗s+1
(
yst − y
s
t+1
)
+
t−1∑
s=0
φs
(
xst − x
s
t+1
)
∈ φ∗t+1Kt + φtKt +
t−1∑
s=0
φ∗s+1Kt +
t−1∑
s=0
φsKt ⊆ Kt.
This means that (ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X), with z0 = u0.
Conversely, suppose that (ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X). Then we put
z := uχ
T
.
It follows that for each t = 0, . . . , T − 1
zt + ψtYt − zt+1 = u
χT
t −G
χT ,ψ
t − u
χT
t+1 ∈ Kt ⊆ Qt
since
Gχ
T ,ψ
t = ψtχ
T∗
t Yt + ψ
∗
t+1χ
T
t Xt = ψtYt.
Next, take any t = 0, . . . , T . Then χTs = χ
t
s = 0 for each s = 0, . . . , t − 1, and
because u satisfies the non-anticipation condition (9), we have zt = u
χT
t = u
χt
t .
Since χtt = χ
t∗
t = 1 and
Gχ
t,ψ
t = ψtχ
t∗
t Yt + ψ
∗
t+1χ
t
tXt = ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt,
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it means that
zt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt − u
χt
t+1 = u
χt
t +G
χt,ψ
t − u
χt
t+1 ∈ Kt ⊆ Qt. (15)
Moreover, for each s = t+ 1, . . . , T we have χts = χ
t∗
s = 0 and
Gχ
t,s
s = ψsχ
t∗
s Ys + ψ
∗
s+1χ
t
sXs = 0,
hence
uχ
t
s − u
χt
s+1 = u
χt
s +G
χt,ψ
s − u
χt
s+1 ∈ Ks ⊆ Qs.
We can verify by backward induction that uχ
t
s+1 ∈ Qs for each s = t, . . . , T .
Clearly, uχ
t
T+1 = 0 ∈ QT . Now suppose that u
χt
s+1 ∈ Qs for some s = t+1, . . . , T .
It follows that uχ
t
s = (u
χt
s − u
χt
s+1) + u
χt
s+1 ∈ Qs + Qs = Qs. By predictability,
uχ
t
s ∈ Ls−1, so we can conclude that u
χt
s ∈ Qs ∩Ls−1 ⊆ Qs−1, which completes
the backward induction argument. In particular, we have shown that uχ
t
t+1 ∈ Qt.
Together with (15), this shows that
zt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt ∈ Qt
for each t = 0, . . . , T . As a result, (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X) with z0 = u0, which
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 24. Observe that for any ψ ∈ X
Qt,ψ = Qχt,ψ =
T∑
u=0
T∑
s=0
χtuψsQu,s =
T∑
s=0
ψs
(
1{t≥s}Ys + 1{t<s}Xt
)
=
t∑
s=0
ψsYs + ψ
∗
t+1Xt.
Now take any u ∈ Φ such that (ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) and define z : X → Φ such
that
zφt := u
φ
t − φ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
ψsYs (16)
for any φ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T + 1. Then z satisfies the non-anticipation
condition (4), z0 = u0, and it also satisfies the rebalancing condition (3) for an
American option with payoff process Z = Q · ,ψ since for any t = 0, . . . , T
zφt + φtQt,ψ − z
φ
t+1
=
(
uφt − φ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
ψsYs
)
+ φt
(
t∑
s=0
ψsYs + ψ
∗
t+1Xt
)
−
(
uφt+1 − φ
∗
t+1
t∑
s=0
ψsYs
)
= uφt + ψtφ
∗
tYt + ψ
∗
t+1φtXt − u
φ
t+1
= uφt +G
φ,ψ
t − u
φ
t+1 ∈ Kt.
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Conversely, take any z ∈ Ψa(−Q · ,ψ) and define u : X → Φ such that
uφt := z
φ
t + φ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
ψsYs
for any φ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T + 1. Then u satisfies the non-anticipation
condition (9), u0 = z0, and
uφt +G
φ,ψ
t − u
φ
t+1
=
(
zφt + φ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
ψsYs
)
+
(
ψtφ
∗
tYt + ψ
∗
t+1φtXt
)
−
(
zφt+1 + φ
∗
t+1
t∑
s=0
ψsYs
)
= zφt + φt
(
t∑
s=0
ψsYs + ψ
∗
t+1Xt
)
− zφt+1
= zφt + φtQt,ψ − z
φ
t+1 ∈ Kt
for any φ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T , that is, the rebalancing condition (8) holds.
The lemma follows because (16) defines a one-to-one map between strategies
z ∈ Ψa(−Q · ,ψ) and strategies u such that (ψ, u) ∈ Φ
b(Y,X) with u0 = z0.
Proof of Theorem 25. By Definition 18,
pibj (Y,X) = sup
{
−x ∈ R | ∃(ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
. (17)
According to Theorem 20, −pibj (Y,X)e
j ∈ Zb0 . Hence, by Proposition 22, there
is a (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X) such that −pibj (Y,X)e
j = z0, and so, by Proposition 23,
there is a (ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) such that −pibj (Y,X)e
j = u0. It follows that the
supremum in (17) is attained,
pibj (Y,X) = max
{
−x ∈ R | ∃(ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
= −min
{
x ∈ R | ∃(ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
.
Hence, according to Lemma 24 and Definition 3,
pibj (Y,X) = −min
{
x ∈ R | ∃ψ ∈ X∃z ∈ Ψa(−Q · ,ψ) : xe
j = z0
}
= −min
ψ∈X
inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃z ∈ Ψa(−Q · ,ψ) : xe
j = z0
}
= −min
ψ∈X
paj(−Q · ,ψ),
where
paj(−Q · ,ψ) = inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃z ∈ Ψa(−Q · ,ψ) : xe
j = z0
}
is the seller’s price of an American option under gradual exercise with payoff
process −Q · ,ψ. By Theorem 4,
paj(−Q · ,ψ) = max
φ∈X
max
(Q,S)∈P¯d
j
(φ)
EQ((−Q · ,ψ · S)φ),
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so
pibj (Y,X) = −min
ψ∈X
paj(−Q · ,ψ)
= −min
ψ∈X
max
φ∈X
max
(Q,S)∈P¯d
j
(φ)
EQ((−Q · ,ψ · S)φ)
= max
ψ∈X
min
φ∈X
min
(Q,S)∈P¯d
j
(φ)
EQ((Q · ,ψ · S)φ).
Theorem 25 has been proved.
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